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The reform of the House of Lords has bedevilled parliamentarians ever since the 
Preamble to the Parliament Act of 1911 stated that it was effectively a temporary 
measure pending the introduction of elected members. This Portfolio of Evidence 
examines the last decade or so of attempts at reform of the House of Lords and 
the lessons to be learned thereof. It traces the chronology from the Labour 
Government’s 2007 White Paper and somewhat inconclusive parliamentary votes 
which followed, together with its 2008 White Paper based squarely on the 
Commons voting preferences for either a wholly or largely elected House.  
Following the 2010 General Election, the Coalition Government took on the 
mantle of implementing reform with a White Paper and Draft Bill which was 
subject to pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee. The fully fledged Bill 
which followed was formally abandoned shortly afterwards in the absence of any 
agreed House of Commons Programme Motion. Fundamental reform has been 
historically a very protracted business and it is clearly in abeyance for the 
immediate and foreseeable future. This political impasse is largely due to a lack 
of parliamentary consensus on how to complete reform, as demonstrated by the 
somewhat contradictory votes of 2007. One unique solution proffered by the 
author in one of his articles is that of holding a referendum to provide a definitive 
public position on this controversial and divisive issue. More modest small-scale 
reforms have, however, been achieved and the Critical Overview Document 
examines the recent history of these developments. It also considers in a wider 
sense the process of constitutional legislative reform partly through the prism of 








CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF PORTFOLIO OF EVIDENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The author has taught the core foundation and mandatory undergraduate LLB 
module of Constitutional and Administrative Law at Coventry University for twenty 
years (and has acted as its Module Leader for the past 18 years). His ongoing 
research (listed in Appendix A) has always informed and shaped the delivery of 
this module’s teaching, together with its assessments. The author’s interest in, 
and foundation for, his research in the area of Constitutional Law is firmly rooted 
in his undergraduate degree of BA (Hons) Irish History, Politics and Society 
obtained at Magee University College, University of Ulster (awarded a 2.1 with a 
first class dissertation and awarded top of his year). As part of his degree he 
studied the areas of politics, British and comparative government/politics, as well 
as political theory. In addition, following his Master’s Degree in Law at City 
University (in which his dissertation presciently examined the constitutional issue 
of the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights), in February 
1993 the author was called to the Bar as a barrister at the Honourable Society of 
Gray’s Inn. The practical element of his 2006 PGCE at University College Cardiff, 
University of Wales, involved teaching Public Law at Coventry University.   
During his time lecturing at Coventry University the author has also taught Civil 
Liberties and Human Rights and more recently European Union Law (in 
particular, its constitutional and institutional aspects). He is currently the Module 
Leader of the undergraduate module entitled ‘The Nature of Law’, which involves 
teaching aspects of jurisprudence, including constitutional concepts and 
principles. Further, for a number of years he had been the Module Leader for a 
variety of undergraduate projects/dissertations – a number of which involved 
constitutional issues, both domestic and international. In 2010 and 2012 he was 
nominated by his undergraduate students for the award of the (national) lecturer 
of the year. In 2011 he was on the Coventry University shortlist of three from the 
whole university academic staff (across all university Faculties) having been 




In terms of his academic research, all his writings are in the area of Public Law. 
His academic articles number 21 (with 13 in peer and 9 in non-peer reviewed 
journals), and over the last decade he has delivered many conference papers to 
the Public Law Section at the Society of Legal Scholars, together with 4 internal 
Coventry University conference papers as part of its Faculty Conference 
programme. Moreover, the author has actively engaged with the United Kingdom 
Parliament with 25 written submissions to a range of parliamentary select 
committees on various constitutional issues and has been quoted or footnoted in 
their subsequent reports. His latest submissions made in early 2017 were, 
fittingly, in relation to the current size of the House of Lords and the lessons to be 
learned from the EU referendum. 
In terms of the links that he has forged with Parliament, on occasions the Political 
and Constitutional Reform Select Committee has contacted him directly to ask 
him to submit evidence (both written and oral). In July 2012 the author was 
specifically invited in his capacity as a constitutional expert to give oral evidence 
on the issue of improving the standards of legislation (his oral evidence was 
televised and printed verbatim in the Select Committee’s report as well as being 
quoted in its main body). More recently, in early 2015 he was called to Parliament 
and thanked in person by the Chair of the Select Committee for the contributions 
that he had made to its deliberations during its parliamentary lifetime of 2010-15. 
In fact, he has been invited to the launch of two of its reports having submitted 
written evidence to them.1 In 2008 the author was listed as a parliamentary 
expert (in respect of the United Kingdom) by the European Centre for 
Parliamentary Research and Documentation.  
In addition to the above publications, the author has also written - without a 
sabbatical or study leave - a highly successful major textbook Unlocking 
Constitutional and Administrative Law 2 (with contributions from Dr Steve Foster) 
which has just had its fourth edition commissioned with a scheduled publication 
date of 2018.  As a supplement to the three paper editions, five periodic online 
                                                          
1
 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Prospects for codifying the relationship between 
central and local government (HC 2012-13, 656-I) Ev w182; A new Magna Carta? (HC 2014-15, 
463) and Consultation on A new Magna Carta? (HC 2014-15, 599) AMC0079. 
2
 Mark Ryan & Steve Foster, Constitutional and Administrative Law (3
rd




updates have also been provided in order to take account of developments in this 
highly topical and dynamic area of law. The content of the book covers the 
entirety of Public Law and includes references to aspects of constitutional reform 
in general whenever appropriate throughout the text. This textbook forms the 
basis of Coventry University’s LLB Constitutional and Administrative Law module 
and was understood to be the bestselling text in its immediate bracket of 
competitors. This is evidence of the author’s overall standing as a constitutional 
lawyer as it has always been well received academically as demonstrated by the 
review of the second edition in The Law Teacher by the Head of Law at Bradford 
University, Professor Christopher Gayle. He stated that lecturers should be 
happy to recommend it as a textbook. He commented that the book had a clear 
and logical layout, was user–friendly, accessible and that ‘It stands alone as a 
very respectable text for use when the topics are being discussed, but also 
signposts further reading for the keener student’.3   
The focus of the author’s research in the last two decades has been in the area 
of Public Law and in particular, in the dynamic area of constitutional reform.  
Within the broad area of constitutional reform, although the author has written in 
the fields of human rights, the Supreme Court and fixed-term Parliaments, the 
overwhelming majority of his research has focused specifically on the reform of 
the House of Lords. His articles in this area have continuously charted the ebb 
and flow of the attempts (and failures) at reform. His academic articles in general 
have been referred to in various textbooks.4 
All of the above illustrate that the author has acquired a national profile and 
reputation as an academic with a specialism and expertise in constitutional 
reform, which has enhanced the profile of Coventry University within academic 
circles. In addition, through his outreach to various parliamentary select 
committees, he has brought the University squarely to the attention of the United 
Kingdom Parliament. The author provides seven outputs (which comprise six 
                                                          
3
 (2011) 45 The Law Teacher 261, 262. 
4
 For example in respect of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, see Alexander Horne and 
Andrew Le Sueur (eds) Parliament: legislation and Accountability (Hart, 2016) 67; John Alder 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (10
th
 edn, Palgrave, 2015) 262 (designated as ‘Further 
Reading’) and Roger Masterman and Colin Murray Exploring Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (Pearson 2013) 293 described the article in Further Reading as an ‘illuminating discussion’  
with a  ‘detailed and clear analysis’ of the Act.  
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articles, together with a 2016 conference paper) as part of his Portfolio of 
Evidence. All these articles were published in peer-reviewed journals between 
the years of 2009 and 2015. In addition, these will be supported by other 
publications including parliamentary submissions and conference papers (these 
are all listed in Appendix A).   
 
The Outputs are as follows: 
(A) RYAN, MR ‘A summary of the developments in the reform of the House of 
Lords since 2005’ (2012) 21 Nott LJ 65.    
(B) RYAN, MR ‘The latest attempt at reform of the House of Lords - one step 
forward and another one back’ (2013) 22 Nott LJ 1.  
(C) RYAN, MR ’The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010: The 
evolution and development of a constitutional Act’ (2014) 35 Liverpool Law 
Review 233. 
(D) RYAN, MR ‘Bills of Steel: The House of Lords Reform Act 2014’ [2015] PL 
558. 
(E) RYAN, MR ‘A consensus on the reform of the House of Lords?’ (2009) 60 
NILQ 325. 
(F) RYAN, MR ‘A referendum on the reform of the House of Lords?’  (2015) 66 
NILQ 223.    
(G) RYAN, MR ‘The process of constitutional legislation - an analysis of six case  
     studies’ (paper bank of the SLS Conference at Oxford University 2016).   
 
The rationale behind the above-listed order of Outputs is as follows. The author 
considered it important to distinguish between the two different types of Output 
presented.  Accordingly, the 7 Outputs were divided into those which were 
published in peer-reviewed journals (ie Outputs A – F) which were listed first, 
whereas, in contrast, the 7th Output (Output G) was a conference paper - albeit 
that it had been published on the website of the Society of Legal Scholars and 
delivered orally to the Public Law section of the Conference. The author 
considered it important to differentiate and list the Outputs in this order, even 
though by doing so, the Output list did not follow exactly the sequence of the 
12 
 
Portfolio’s sub-themes (as sub-theme 3 is connected to the final listed Output G).  
Nevertheless, the author considered that this did not in any way affect the 
integrity or overall structure and cohesion of the Portfolio.    
The overall chronology of, and connection between, these 7 Outputs is detailed 
as follows. Outputs A and B were twin articles written over the course of two 
years and published in the same journal in consecutive annual volumes (ie 21 
and 22). In this way they are necessarily connected by providing a narrative of 
the ebb and flow of attempts at fundamental reform (as developed through sub-
theme 1). These Outputs were followed by the Outputs C and D, both of which 
were also concerned with the arc of attempts at reform, albeit in relation to 
smaller scale reform of the Lords. In turn, Outputs C and D were themselves 
intimately connected in that they analysed different timelines of interim Lords 
reform: Output C was focused specifically on the 2010 Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Bill/Act, whereas, Output D was based on the 2014 House of Lords 
Reform Act, albeit with appropriate earlier historical references. Together Outputs 
C and D (with elements of B) formed the basis of sub-theme 2. Accordingly, the 
first 4 Outputs are necessarily connected to one another (as are sub-themes 1 
and 2).  
Output E is historically, the earliest article written by the author as it was 
composed in light of the 2007 parliamentary votes and laid the foundation and 
direction for the rest of the Portfolio of Evidence to follow and build around. The 
Output analysed the issue of consensus on Lords reform (hence the inspiration 
for the rest of the Portfolio) explored through the prism of the 2007 parliamentary 
votes set out in sub-theme 4. This Output is also directly related to Output A in 
terms of the latter’s reference to the 2007 votes. Output F was written after two 
years of research and provided a practical solution to the impasse on Lords 
reform. The sub-theme of holding a referendum, which is developed at length in 
Output F, in effect brings together the other sub-themes (and so by extension, 
the other Outputs) by providing a possible solution to the interminable issue of 
Lords reform.  Finally, Output G, as noted, was a conference paper which formed 
the basis of sub-theme 3, which examined the general process of constitutional 
legislation, drawing upon legislation highlighted in other Outputs viz., the House 
13 
 
of Lords Reform Bill 2012 (Outputs A and B); the 2010 Constitutional Reform and 


























AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The overall theme of this Critical Overview Document is an analysis by the author 
to chronicle the attempts to realise long-term fundamental reform in the last 
decade or so. It also examined the issue of incremental reform, together with the 
process of legislative constitutional change with reference to Lords reform. The 
Document also considers the lack of political consensus on how to complete the 
reform of the second chamber and concludes with a solution offered to help 
resolve this political impasse.   
The specific aims and objectives are set out in the following five sub-themes:  
1. To add progressively to the boundaries of knowledge and research in 
relation to the historic narrative arc of governmental/parliamentary 
attempts at long-term reform of the House of Lords in the last decade. 
This first sub-theme is supported mainly by the following combined twin 
publications in the Nottingham Law Journal:  RYAN, MR ‘A summary of the 
developments in the reform of the House of Lords since 2005.’ (2012) 21 Nott LJ 
65; and RYAN, MR ‘The latest attempt at reform of the House of Lords - one step 
forward and another one back.’ (2013) 22 Nott LJ 1.    
2. To add progressively to the boundaries of knowledge and research in 
relation to the historic narrative arc of attempts at interim reform of the 
House of Lords in the last decade.  
This second sub-theme is supported mainly by the following three publications: 
RYAN, MR ‘Bills of Steel: The House of Lords Reform Act 2014.’ [2015] PL 558; 
together with elements of the following two articles: RYAN, MR ‘The latest 
attempt at reform of the House of Lords - one step forward and another one 
back.’ (2013) 22 Nott LJ 1; and RYAN, MR ’The Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act 2010: The evolution and development of a constitutional Act.’ 
(2014) 35 Liverpool Law Review 233.  
3 To add progressively to the boundaries of knowledge and research in 
relation to the process for legislative constitutional change, with reference 
to the House of Lords. 
15 
 
This sub-theme draws upon a conference paper delivered to the SLS at Oxford 
University in September 2016 which examined the parliamentary process of 
constitutional reform. This paper was available in the online SLS paper bank  (it 
is the intention of the author that this piece will be ready for publication in due 
course in an appropriate legal or political science journal).   
4 To examine critically the degree of consensus, if any, within Parliament in 
relation to the issue of fundamental reform of the House of Lords.   
This fourth sub-theme is supported by the following publication: RYAN, MR ‘A 
consensus on the reform of the House of Lords?’ (2009) 60 NILQ 325. 
5 To devise and proffer a solution in order to break the current (and historic) 
deadlock in relation to the issue of the long-term reform of the House of 
Lords.     
This final sub-theme is supported mainly by the following publication of:  RYAN, 
MR ‘A referendum on the reform of the House of Lords?’  (2015) 66 NILQ 223.    
 
The above are supplemented by published articles in both refereed and non-
refereed journals, but equally importantly by written submissions to parliamentary 
select committees with their reference in these reports.  In addition, chapter 10 
(viz., Parliament III: the House of Lords) of the author’s textbook provides general 
background information relating to the House of Lords. All of these provide 
further evidence of the author’s continued and sustained research in the area of 






A REVIEW OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON THE REFORM OF THE 
HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
Two points need to be made at the outset: first, the sources for the Portfolio of 
Evidence are not exclusively legal, but inter-disciplinary involving an inter-play to 
some extent between law and politics/political science/British Government. 
Second, given the constant developments in Lords reform in the last decade or 
so, the Portfolio’s subject matter is of a particularly fast-moving nature. Source 
material, therefore, dates rapidly as it is unable to keep pace and capture the 
most recent narrative of events. This explains the seeming limited number of 
contemporaneous articles (especially legal ones) which track the most recent 
narrative of Lords reform. The origin of the literature can divided as follows: 
 
 Academic literature involving books and journal articles (both legal and 
political); 
 Publications of The Constitution Unit (an adjunct of University College 
London);  
 Government Command papers; 
 Parliamentary reports issued by select committees;  
 Informational material from the libraries of both the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords.  
 
The literature can also be divided into the following: 
 Type A: Literature/sources relating to the British constitution in general 
which includes reference to the House of Lords (including an overview of 
reform); 
 Type B: Literature/sources focusing exclusively on the House of Lords as 
a parliamentary chamber (including reform); 
 Type C: Literature/sources on constitutional reform in general, but with  
reference to the reform of the House of Lords;   
 Type D: Literature/sources focusing specifically on charting the history of 






There are many standard textbooks on Public Law and although these texts 
examine the House of Lords as one of the institutions of State, owing to space, 
they only provide a very general reference to attempts at reform of the House of 
Lords, and moreover, this narrative dates rapidly. For example, in the most 
recent edition of the long-established text by Bradley, Ewing & Knight 
(Constitutional and Administrative Law),5 little more than a page is provided on 
reform since 1999. Similarly, Oxford University’s English Public Law6 sets out 
only a cursory mention of reform comprising one paragraph for the ten year 
period of 1999-2008. In contrast, Loveland’s text, Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law and Human Rights7 provides a fuller and historical narrative 
of reform, but declines to mention the 2007 parliamentary votes and is rather 
brief on the most recent dynamic events of 2010-14.  In addition, the long 
awaited fourth edition of McEldowney’s text8 in 2016 provides only a few pages 
on recent reform.  
 
In terms of Public Law sourcebooks, Fenwick’s 2017 text9 provides an impressive 
chapter on the House of Lords which includes coverage of the reform debate in a 
thematic, rather than strictly chronological way, and includes relevant documents. 
It unfortunately gives uneven treatment to events, as the 2007 votes merit a 
single line. As an aside, the sourcebook sets out a sizeable extract from one of 
the author’s articles on Lords reform,10 as well as quoting him elsewhere in the 
text.11  The well-established Public Law sourcebook British Government and the 
Constitution12 by Turpin and Tomkins, devotes only a few pages to reform. This 
                                                          
5
 Anthony Bradley, Keith Ewing and Christopher Knight, Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(16
th
 edn, Pearson, 2015) 182ff. The author was referenced at page 247 in respect of his article 
on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.    
6
  Dawn Oliver, ‘The law of Parliament’ in David Feldman (ed) English Public Law (2
nd
 edn, OUP, 
2009) 2.37.  
7
 Ian Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights (7
th
 edn, OUP, 2015) 
183ff. 
8
 John McEldowney, Public Law (4
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 129ff. 
9
 Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson & Alexander Williams, Text, Cases and Materials on Public 
Law and Human Rights (4
th
 edn, Routledge, 2017) chapter 9.   
10
 ibid 390-1 in respect of his article in Public Law on the House of Lords Reform Act 2014. 
11
 ibid 498 in respect of his article in Public Law on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. 
12
 Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (7
th
 edn, CUP, 2012) 
656ff. The previous edition referenced the author’s article on the Supreme Court: Mark Ryan, 
‘The House of Lords and the shaping of the Supreme Court’ (2005) 56 NILQ 135, Colin Turpin 
and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (6
th
 edn, CUP, 2007) 126.  
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narrative ends with the 2011 Draft House of Lords Reform Bill, thereby rather 
neatly illustrating how rapidly source material can be overtaken by the most 
recent developments.  In terms of much older and classic texts such as Hood 
Phillips,13 though distinguished, these are of historic interest only in terms of the 
scope of this Portfolio. Finally, the author’s own latest edition of his textbook14 
has a chapter devoted to the House of Lords, which concludes with an overview 
of recent reform up until 2013, although its next edition scheduled for 2018 will 
summarise developments up until December 2017.    
 
In terms of the political sciences, the leading commentators King and Bogdanor 
have both published in the area of the House of Lords. King and his text The 
British Constitution15 contained a chapter on the House of Lords with a few pages 
on reform with its commentary ending at 2007, and Bogdanor’s even older text 
(re-printed in 2007) The British constitution in the twentieth century16 ended at the 
even earlier reform timeline of 2000. His more recent 2009 text, The New 
Constitution17 has a much fuller historical account and broader overview of 
reform in a chapter entitled ‘A reformed House?’, however, the period between 
1997 to 2008 lacked real detail on this particularly eventful time.   
 
As far as Type A journal publications are concerned, it is unsurprising that there 
is a lacuna of academic articles on the British constitution in general which 
include in-depth and comprehensive analysis of developments in House of Lords 
reform.  By way of example, ‘Public Law’ is a quarterly legal journal which is the 
natural vehicle for all matters constitutional. However, although it has a periodic 
short section entitled ‘Parliament’, this only provides a somewhat terse account 
highlighting recent events in Parliament (including those in the House of Lords).  
Indeed, the dearth of information on Lords reform was neatly demonstrated by 
the fact that the author was unable to locate any detail on the 2007 parliamentary 
votes in any of the issues of the 2007 or 2008 editions of the journal. In contrast, 
                                                          
13
 O Hood Phillips and Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2001) 190ff.  
14
 (n 2) chapter 10. 
15
 Anthony King, The British Constitution (OUP, 2007) chapter 12.  
16
 Rhodri Walters, ‘The House of Lords’ in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), The British constitution in the 
twentieth century (OUP,  2007) chapter 6. 
17
 Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart, 2009) chapter 6. 
19 
 
the author’s combined Outputs of E and A provided comprehensive and critical 
analysis of this development.  Accordingly, the overall aspiration behind the 
author’s Portfolio of works was to close the crucial gap in legal knowledge and 
critical analysis in existing legal journals (both legal and political), together with 
the lacuna identified in the textbooks above.      
 
Type B: 
Although now dated, one of the classic texts in historic terms to focus specifically 
on the House of Lords is Shell’s The House of Lords (re-issued in 2013).18 This 
provides an overview of composition, functions, powers and reform, with 
coverage of the latter being supplemented by a 2007 Addendum to summarise 
briefly the period of 2006-07. Professor Russell’s more recent text The 
contemporary House of Lords19 authoritatively focuses on the chamber post 1999 
and includes a specific chapter entitled ‘The politics of Lords reform’, which ends 
its narrative at events in mid-2013.  
 
Although there are some journal articles in respect of Type B publications (ie 
articles exclusively on the House of Lords as a parliamentary chamber), these 
have been written in the areas of, for example: its powers,20 composition,21 or the 
(now defunct) judicial aspect of the House.22 As noted, overall, the author in his 
Portfolio of works has endeavoured to fill the vacuum in the lack of contemporary 
articles devoted to developments in Lords reform. 
 
Type C:  
There are a number of generic books on constitutional reform which examine the 
reform of the British constitution as a whole, but include detail on Lords reform. 
                                                          
18
 Donald Shell, The House of Lords (Manchester University Press, 2013). See also, Donald 
Shell, The House of Lords (Hemel Hempstead, 1992).   
19
 Meg Russell, The contemporary House of Lords: Westminster Bicameralism revived (OUP, 
2013). 
20
 For example, Denis Carter, ‘The Powers and Conventions of the House of Lords’ (2003) 74 
Political Quarterly 319.  See also  Meg Russell and Maria Sciara, ‘The Policy Impact of Defeats in 
the House of Lords’ (2008) 10 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 571.  
21
 For example in relation to the spiritual element, see Anna Harlow, Frank Cranmer and Norman 
Doe, ‘Bishops in the House of Lords: a critical analysis’ [2008] PL 490. 
22
 For example, see Brice Dickson, ‘The processing of appeals in the House of Lords’ (2007) 123 
LQR 571 and the author’s article on the creation of the new Supreme Court:  Ryan, ‘The House of 
Lords and the shaping of the Supreme Court’ (n 12). 
20 
 
These include the now somewhat dated Bogdanor’s Power and the People23 in 
1997 and Blackburn and Plant’s Constitutional Reform24 two years later. In 
addition, Brazier’s Constitutional Reform 25 contains a chapter entitled ‘The 
Second-Chamber paradox’, but is of limited value to the Portfolio as it only covers 
events up until 2007. Indeed, even in the most recent edition of The Changing 
Constitution,26 the Lords reform developments between 1997 and 2014 account 
for only two pages. Similarly, in terms of a general historical account and 
development of the constitution, Lyon’s 2015 text27 sets out the most recent 
period of Lords reform in a matter of pages.   
 
The Constitution Unit has expertise of reporting on all aspects of constitutional 
reform, including that of the House of Lords. The Unit issues apposite reports and 
briefings on issues as they arise. By way of example, in 2011 it produced an 
invaluable report addressing the issue of the excessive number of peers.28   It 
also produces a regular bulletin called The Monitor which provides a brief 
summary of the most recent constitutional events (including those relating to the 
House of Lords),29 and in recent years, has been supplemented by an online 
blog. The Unit’s reports, briefings and publications are regularly referred to by 
both parliamentarians and academics. In fact, the leading expert on reform of the 
House of Lords, Professor Meg Russell (who is now Deputy Head of the 
Constitution Unit), has written extensively in the area of Lords reform for the last 
two decades and is referenced frequently by academics and select committee/ 
parliamentary publications.     
 
In terms of Type C articles concerned with constitutional reform in general, it is 
                                                          
23
 Vernon Bogdanor, Power and the People: A guide to constitutional reform (Victor Gollancz, 
1997) chapter 4. 
24
 Robert  Blackburn, ‘The House of Lords’ in Robert Blackburn and Raymond Plant (eds), 
Constitutional Reform: The Labour Government’s constitutional reform agenda (Longman, 1999) 
chapter 1.  
25
 Rodney Brazier, Constitutional reform: Reshaping the British Political System (3
rd
 edn, OUP, 
2008) chapter 5. 
26
 Lord Norton, ‘Parliament: A new assertiveness?’ in Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn Oliver and Colm 
O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (8
th
 edn, OUP, 2015) 189-90.   
27
 Ann Lyon, The constitutional history of the UK (2
nd
 edn, Routledge, 2016) 419-422. 
28
 Meg Russell, et al, House Full, time to get a grip on Lords appointments (The Constitution Unit, 
2011).  
29
 For example on the House of Lords Reform Act 2014, see The Constitution Unit/Monitor 
57/June 2014 ‘Parliament: A Lords reform finally happened: but who knew?’ 3. 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications [last accessed July 18 2015].  
21 
 
not a surprise that there exists a lacuna of generic journal articles on 
constitutional reform which include comprehensive reference to Lords reform. 
This is no doubt partly due to its subject matter being both dynamic and complex, 
as it can only be truly understood in its full historical and political context.  In 
relation to the process of constitutional reform, although there is existing 
authoritative work30 on the procedural aspects of the passage of Bills of a 
constitutional nature, it is now somewhat dated (ie it related to 1997-2005).  
Accordingly, the author in Output G attempted to fill the vacuum in respect of 
more contemporary legislation with a critical analysis of the comparative 
parliamentary process of six constitutional Bills dating from 2005 to 2016 (most of 
which were connected to the House of Lords).  In this way the author has added 
to the legal and parliamentary knowledge on the legislative process for 
constitutional reform. The unique nature of this Output is demonstrated by the 
fact that that no journal article (legal or political) has subjected these selected 
Bills to focused examination and in doing so,  revealed the vagaries of the 
parliamentary process for these measures.  
 
In terms of the general constitutional process of reform, the author’s Output F to 
some extent bridged the gap between the literature and sources of Types C and 
D. This Output proposed a bespoke resolution to the interminable problem of 
Lords reform through the constitutional mechanism of holding a referendum in 
order that the constitutional reform process could be determined by means of 
direct democracy. Such is the unique and innovative nature of the Output, that 
the author is unaware of any modern academic journal article (legal or otherwise) 
which has proposed and substantiated a case for a referendum on the reform of 
the House of Lords as a practical solution to the political impasse on this issue. 
 
Type D: 
This type of source is naturally highly specialist. One of the most recent texts is 
Dorey and Kelso’s House of Lords reform since 1911,31 which provided a 
comprehensive chronological history of reform from 1911, albeit the detail is a 
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little sparse on the period of 2005 to 2010.  Similarly, Ballinger’s The House of 
Lords 1911-201132 captures twentieth century reform in detail, together with 
some narrative from 2005 to the 2012 House of Lords Reform Bill. In 2011 a 
highly specialist collection of essays relating to the 2011 Draft Bill was published 
with Fitzpatrick as its editor.33  Other books specifically on Lords reform include 
the classic Reforming the House of Lords lessons from overseas 34 by Russell, 
who placed reform in a comparative context.  A slightly older textbook is Richard 
& Welfare’s Unfinished business35 which concludes reform just at the start of 
1999.  At the time of writing, it is rather propitious that in late June 2017, Norton 
published a brief guide to the reform of the House Lords.36 This evidently drew 
upon his earlier work in 198237 and provided an interesting and novel thematic 
approach based on the four R’s: Retain, Reform, Replace, Remove altogether. 
Although it provides a summary of events, this is necessarily brief in line with the 
nature of the book as part of its ‘Pocket Politics’ series. Finally, from a purely 
historical perspective, in 2015 the fourth volume of Raina’s history of the House 
of Lords38 was published, which brought together related reform documents.      
 
The libraries of both the House of Lords and Commons periodically produce 
reports on matters relating to Lords reform, an illustration being the very useful 
report on the votes of MPs on Lords reform in 2007.39 In addition, Governments 
of all hues have issued Command Papers, typically in the form of a White Paper 
(for example, the Labour Government’s paper in 2007).40 In addition, select 
committees from both Houses, as well as joint ones, have published a number of 
apposite reports. For the purposes of the ambit of this Portfolio, however, the 
work of the (now defunct) House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform 
Select Committee has been particularly valuable, for example, on interim Lords 
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reform.41 The publications of the above punctuate the author’s Outputs and are 
mentioned throughout the Portfolio of Evidence where appropriate. 
Finally, in terms of academic journal articles, although there have been individual 
publications on aspects of the developments in respect of the reform of the 
House of Lords (for example, McClean et al on the 2003 votes in the 
Commons),42  these have been somewhat ad hoc pieces and have been 
referenced where relevant in the author’s Outputs. Moreover, these have tended 
to be published in political science journals,43 rather than purely legal ones. In 
fact, in terms of the decade or so covered by the timeline of this Portfolio, there 
has been an evident lacuna in journal articles focusing exclusively on the reform 
of the House of Lords. As noted, this is no doubt partly due to the ephemeral 
nature and ever-shifting pace of the subject matter. By way of illustration of the 
gap in knowledge and understanding of Lords reform,  in the journal  Public Law 
(which by its constitutional nature would be a natural repository for articles on the 
House of Lords), the author could only identify a handful of articles between 2007 
and 2015 related to the House of Lords. These included a somewhat broad piece 
on reform by Lord Bingham which floated a proposal to replace the House with a 
‘Council of the Realm’,44  as well as an article on the contribution of the Bishops 
in the chamber (identified earlier in Type B).45  Indeed, it is rather fitting for the 
purposes of the Portfolio that during this period, the only piece relating to 
contemporary concrete proposals for Lords reform in the journal was written by 
the author (on the 2014 House of Lords Reform Act).46          
In short, there is no single authored contemporaneous journal article (legal or 
otherwise) which connected, charted and integrated a timeline for the key period 
of 2005- 2013 in respect of attempts at fundamental reform of the House of 
Lords. Outputs A and B of the author filled that lacuna by providing a full 
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synthesis of the attempts at wholesale reform during those years. Furthermore, 
Output E examined in comprehensive detail the 2007 parliamentary votes and its 
originality is underscored with there being no other legal article which examined, 
interpreted and analysed the underlying patterns of these votes. Similarly, in 
respect of the timeline of interim reform (ie 2007-2015), Outputs C and D 
provided a full and original synthesis of the attempts to achieve small-scale 
changes.  Indeed, Output C stands alone as an article providing a 
comprehensive and critical examination of the Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act 2010 and Output D was the only detailed contemporary article 
published on the House of Lords Reform Act 2014.47 In conclusion, the collection 
of works contained in the author’s Portfolio have provided an invaluable 
contribution to the issue of Lords reform and helped close the gap in knowledge 













                                                          
47






In broad overview, the methodology employed involved a doctrinal, integrated 
and qualitative approach using both primary and secondary sources. The Critical 
Overview Document involves five inter-connected, sub-themes within the 
overarching common theme of reform of the House of Lords.  In general, the 
methodology employed, and sources utilised, was to some extent tailored to each 
of the various discrete sub-themes. Furthermore, at the outset it must be 
emphasised that there are, of course, difficulties in providing a methodology in 
view of the inherent (and necessarily) retrospective nature of works written over a 
number of years, which are thereafter drawn together and compiled - and then 
connected -  in a Portfolio of works.  
In terms of primary sources, the general methodology involved identifying 
parliamentary legislative measures pertinent to the reform of the House of Lords, 
together with selected general constitutional reform measures. The Bills located 
included both those in draft form, as well as those which were fully-fledged (some 
of which also became Acts). The origin of the Bills examined also differed in that 
they comprised both those introduced by the Government (ie Public Bills), as well 
as those drafted by backbenchers in both Houses (ie Private Member’s Bills). 
The detail, context and implications of these Bills - including apposite extracted 
specified clauses - were analysed and critiqued. 
The general methodology also made invaluable use of a wide range of secondary 
material obtained from various sources which were synthesised with the primary 
sources in order to supplement and contextualise these primary materials.  The 
academic treatment of the secondary sources involved examining and 
interpreting official parliamentary debates, motions and voting lists detailed in 
Hansard, together with an analysis of the reports and findings of various select 
committees. In terms of the latter, this also included utilising apposite 
parliamentary submissions (written and oral) made by the author to support his 
contentions. These were supplemented by an evaluation of a range of pertinent 
papers and briefings from the libraries of the House of Lords and House of 
Commons. In addition, Government papers in the form of a number of Command 
Papers (White and Green) were critically examined, together with party political 
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materials in the form of general election manifestos and the 2010 Coalition 
Agreement. Finally, publications drawn from the Constitution Unit, together with 
appropriate academic opinions and articles, were evaluated and integrated with 
the aforementioned sources. Given the nature of a Portfolio of works, of 
necessity, these academic articles included the author’s own publications 
(Outputs A to F), but was not confined simply to the Outputs listed, as it included 
other works of his as well.  
These primary and secondary sources were interwoven and synthesised to 
identify and create a full historic and analytical narrative connecting the complex 
series of attempts at both fundamental and more small-scale reform of the House 
of Lords (Outputs A to D). In order to uncover original detail relating to the 
comparative parliamentary passage of constitutional reform Bills; six measures 
were selected for scrutiny. Using mainly parliamentary and Government  
materials, these Bills were then critically examined in order to assess and critique 
their compliance with a transposed bespoke procedural checklist recommended 
by a House of Lords select committee. The results of this research were 
compiled in a number of originally constructed Tables in which the findings were 
displayed in comparative format (Output G).  
The parliamentary voting figures on a range of options for Lords reform were 
located in Hansard and thereafter the voting patterns extracted, cross-referenced 
and interpreted in order to arrive at a conclusion about a consensus, or 
otherwise, on completing long-term reform. In addition, through the prism of 
parliamentary and Government sources in particular, the arguments for and 
against an elected House (and Lords reform in general) were extracted, analysed 
and critiqued (Output E).  Finally, the recommendation of a parliamentary Joint 
Committee which had adopted the author’s suggestion for holding a referendum 
on Lords reform was explored in detail.  This drew upon a range of secondary 
sources, but made particular use of academic journals (especially political ones) 
in the area of referendums and democratic principles. These issues of 
constitutional, legal and political theory were then analysed and synthesised. In 
this way, it was somewhat more inter-disciplinary than the other strands of the 
Portfolio, but was necessary in order to contextualise some of the theoretical 
arguments for a referendum (Output F).       
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THE AUTHOR’S RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS IN THE AREA 
OF THE REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
 
1. A narrative arc and synthesis of long-term reform of the House of 
Lords 2005-2013  
This first sub–theme provides an historic chronological narrative which connects 
and synthesises the various attempts at reform of the House of Lords in the last 
decade or so commencing in 2005. As an aside, that year also witnessed a 
structural reform of the House with the enactment of the Constitutional Reform 
Act. This provided for the creation of a separate Supreme Court and the passage 
of the judicial aspect of this legislation was examined in a lengthy article in 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly.48 The period covering 2005-2012 is examined 
in the author’s article which was published in Nottingham Law Journal49 
(hereafter Output A). The significant developments which followed during the 
dynamic period of 2012-13 are analysed in a second follow-up article (Output 
B).50 In fact, Output A was specifically accepted by Nottingham Law Journal on 
the understanding that it would form part of an overall two-part integrated 
chronicle of reform. In this way, Outputs A & B are inextricably linked.  The author 
understands that there are no contemporaneous legal journal articles which 
synthesised, analysed and chartered this period. These twin Outputs, therefore, 
provide an original and invaluable contribution to the debate on Lords reform.     
The starting point for Output A was the Labour Party’s 2005 General Election 
manifesto51 which promised to proceed with reforming the House of Lords by 
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including a free vote on how it should be composed. In due course, in February 
2007,52 the Labour Government published its third White Paper on Lords reform, 
which followed on from those previously issued in 199953 and 2001,54 together 
with a 2003 Consultation Paper.55  The purpose of the 2007 White Paper was to 
set the context for the parliamentary votes scheduled to take place one month 
later on the future composition of a fully reformed House of Lords. The Paper 
mooted that if a hybrid option was to be adopted, once it had bedded down, it 
could have its proportions reviewed, which as the author argued, implied that this 
hybrid option was an inherently unstable constitutional solution.56  The series of 
votes which followed in both Houses in March 2007 embraced a range of options 
from a wholly appointed House through to an elected one, with hybrid options in 
between. In fact, these models were the same as those voted on by Parliament in 
the previous parliamentary vote in early 200357  (which had been preceded by a 
Joint Committee).58  The problem with the outcome of the 2007 votes was that 
there was disagreement between the two Houses, as although the Commons 
had voted for an 80 per cent and a fully elected chamber, the Lords had voted 
overwhelmingly for a fully appointed House.  A detailed analysis of the 
consensus, or otherwise, of these votes is examined in sub-theme 4.  
Output A then moved on to critique the broad principles detailed in the Labour 
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Government’s 2008 White Paper59 which followed on directly from the above 
votes.  The Government invited responses to the contents and the author duly 
made a written submission. For this he received a personal detailed three-page 
reply from the Constitutional Settlement Division of the Ministry of Justice which 
responded point by point to his critique, and thanked him for his views which 
would be used to help inform the reform process.60  The 2008 White Paper was 
framed purely by the votes cast by MPs in March 2007 with the result that the 
options for reform were confined solely to either a wholly or a largely elected 
chamber. The author was critical of the Labour Government’s failure to provide a 
clear steer to Parliament or the public as to which of these models was 
preferable. This was because these two options were not merely differences of 
degree, but instead different in kind (i.e. the principle of absolutism versus 
hybridity), and so represented fundamentally different constitutional 
propositions.61  This point was also made by the author in his submission to the 
Ministry of Justice, which resulted in the reply that the White Paper had simply 
not taken a view between these two options.62 Output A then set out the various 
elements of the composition (e.g. staggered long-terms, etc.), and the author was 
critical that the Government had failed to put forward its preferred electoral 
system.63   
The 2008 White Paper stated that the ‘Next steps’ were for a manifesto 
commitment to be formulated for the next General Election. The period of 2009-
10, however, involved an (albeit largely unsuccessful) attempt at more modest 
reform via the vehicle of the Labour Government’s 2009-10 Constitutional Reform 
and Governance Bill, which is examined in the first aspect of sub-theme 2. After 
the inconclusive result of the 2010 General Election, the Coalition Government 
agreed to establish a cross-party committee on House of Lords reform,64  which 
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in due course produced a White Paper which included a Draft House of Lords 
Reform Bill.65   
Output A then surveyed the key elements of the Draft Bill which the author 
regarded as hardly authoritative given that it was hedged with reservations.  The 
Draft included a hybrid chamber of 300 members, serving single terms 
amounting to around three parliaments (i.e. electoral periods). The author 
identified that shortly after the publication of this White Paper, the problem of 
variable parliaments had to some extent been resolved with the enactment of the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 which introduced five-year fixed terms.66 The 
Draft Bill prescribed no extra legal powers for the House and the author 
pinpointed its ‘General saving clause’ which had asserted that the Act would not 
affect either the primacy of the Commons or the existing conventions regulating 
the two Houses. The author regarded both of these propositions as contestable 
and are explored in sub-theme 4. A Joint Committee of both Houses of 
Parliament was then established to provide pre-legislative scrutiny of the Draft 
Bill. This was evidence of good constitutional legislative practice – a procedural 
issue examined in sub-theme 3.   
Output B, which formed the lead article for the Nottingham Law Journal’s annual 
volume, detailed the chronology of the second period of reform in this sub-theme 
(i.e. 2012 to 2013). The Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill 
(hereafter the Joint Committee) issued its report in April 2012.67 The author’s 
Output drew upon his written evidence submitted to it,68 elements of which were 
quoted and footnoted in the report.69 Output B was also based upon his 
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conference paper70 delivered to the 2012 SLS Conference at Bristol University, 
which examined the recommendations of the Joint Committee. The Output 
considered this far from unanimous report, which to the author was unsurprising 
given that at the time he had questioned whether such a large committee 
(comprising 24 members) would be able to produce a report without division.71 
Further, in a highly unusual move, a minority of members of the Joint Committee 
were moved to issue their own separate, but parallel, report (viz, the Alternative 
Report).72 In particular, it insisted that the powers, functions and roles of the 
second chamber should be determined prior to its composition. In other words, 
form should follow function.73 The author had also made this point earlier in his 
written submission to the Ministry of Justice in the context of the 2008 White 
Paper. This Paper had been driven by the 2007 votes which, in turn, had focused 
solely on composition, without reference to the role of the House.74  
Output B began by examining the key aspects of the Joint Committee’s report 
and assessed that it had to a large extent endorsed the Draft Bill. The Joint 
Committee took the view that the proposal of a chamber of 300 members was too 
small, and in so doing, supported and footnoted75 the author who had argued this 
in his written evidence.76 As the Output stated, a key point in relation to size was 
that it should not compromise the ability of the House to carry out its functions.77   
Although the Joint Committee agreed that a 15 year term was preferred, the 
author had asserted that in international terms this was an inordinately long 
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period and was footnoted in its report.78  The author also considered it somewhat 
odd that one of the Joint Committee’s reasons justifying this length was to 
actually weaken the democratic mandate of the second chamber, vis a vis the 
Commons.79  The Joint Committee agreed that terms should be non-renewable, 
however, the author80 footnoted in its report,81 had stressed that the essence of 
accountability lay in the necessity for re-election. Further, as the Draft contained 
no recall mechanism, the author had proposed one in his written evidence which 
was footnoted by the Joint Committee82 which then recommended that provision 
be made for one in the fully-fledged Bill.83 The author had contended that the 
need for the upper chamber members to be subject to the possibility of recall was 
even more important than for MPs given the proposed lengthy term.84 As an 
aside, the Coalition Government’s Formal Response acknowledged this 
recommendation and stated that it would consider it once the impending select 
committee report on the recall of MPs had been published.85                
The Output noted that the most divisive areas of the Draft Bill were the 
inextricably linked issues of the electoral mandate and powers. The author 
argued the point that to ‘democratise’ the House (the raison d’ etre of reform) 
necessarily required the conferment of additional powers to reflect this new-found 
democratically legitimate status.86  He also contended that consideration should 
have been given to the question of whether the House should be granted extra 
powers in relation to Constitutional Bills,87 given its commonly agreed role as a 
constitutional safeguard. In fact, in 2011 the House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution had quoted the author who had asserted in his written evidence 
that the role of the House of Lords should be strengthened in order that the ‘role 
and responsibility in relation to scrutinising constitutional measures’ should be 
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given a more formal role.88  Further, a point the author had submitted in his 
written evidence to the Joint Committee was that an elected House would be 
more aggressive and that it was not fanciful to suggest that these ‘newly elected 
members emboldened by their democratic credentials’ could prove to be 
strategically and practically obstructive in terms of Government business.89 
Moreover, in the Output the author criticised the Joint Committee’s contention 
that a more assertive House would not enhance the role of Parliament in respect 
of the Government of the day90 (something which the Coalition Government in its 
Formal Response also rejected).91 Both the Alternative Report and the author 
disputed that primacy would be safeguarded under the Draft Bill. The former 
stated that the evidence the Joint Committee had received (which included that 
by the author),92 did not accept that primacy would remain undisturbed.93  Finally, 
the Joint Committee recommended a referendum which, therefore, supported the 
author’s suggestion (this is examined in sub-theme 5).       
The Output then examined the Government’s Formal Response which was 
issued in June 2012 in parallel with the publication of its fully-fledged House of 
Lords Reform Bill. In broad terms, the Government accepted the general thrust of 
the Joint Committee’s report and accordingly the fully-fledged 2012 Bill was 
similar to its original incarnation as a Draft. There were some differences, 
however, and the Output identified two pertinent ones. First, the Government 
accepted the recommendation in relation to size and increased the chamber to 
450 members in the Bill.94 Second, the Government – rather controversially - 
stated that the semi-open list system would replace the STV set out in the Draft 
Bill. This was notwithstanding the fact that this meant that there would be two 
electoral systems for the same chamber raising issues of competing legitimacies. 
In addition, it meant that this electoral system had not received pre-legislative 
scrutiny (a crucial aspect in the legislative process for constitutional Bills, see 
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sub-theme 3). Finally, the Government rejected the Joint Committee’s call for a 
referendum.     
Output B then provided an original analysis of the fully-fledged Bill during its two-
day Second Reading in the Commons.  This revealed that the debate had 
essentially divided into two broad themes. First, that relating to a Programme 
Motion to accompany the Bill. The second, and more dominant area of the 
debate, covered the issues of primacy and inter-House constitutional relations. 
As the Bill was not a free vote, unlike those in 2003 and 2007, the author 
highlighted the issue of whether party whipping should ever take place on a 
constitutional Bill.95  Through original examination of the voting patterns of the 
main parties, the author identified that of the 124 MPs who voted against the Bill; 
over two thirds were Conservative, despite the fact that it was consistent with 
their 2010 General Election manifesto for a largely elected House. The author 
even identified one Parliamentary Private Secretary who resigned his position in 
order to vote against the Bill.96 The Labour Party’s policy was to support the Bill, 
notwithstanding it was contrary to their 2010 manifesto for a wholly elected 
House (although the author did identify 26 Labour MPs who voted against the 
measure).  Original research conducted by the author also ascertained that not 
only did most speakers oppose the Bill, but that over 20 MPs spoke in favour of a 
referendum (see sub-theme 5).  In the absence of any Programme Motion, the 
Coalition Government abandoned the Bill shortly thereafter, Output B concluded 
by considering the position as it stood in spring 2013. In essence, it was clear 
that long-term reform was moribund and at that point in time, the prospects for 
short-term reform looked unpromising (see sub-theme 2). At the time of writing, 
the point that long-term reform is off the political table for some time to come, has 
been underlined by the new 2017 Conservative Government which has  stated in 
its manifesto that comprehensive Lords reform was not a priority.97  
The lesson for long-term reform of the House of Lords is that despite the recent 
events in the last decade, it is highly unlikely to occur in the immediate future. Not 
only is the political will lacking, but owing to its divisive nature, any fundamental 
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Lords Reform Bill would struggle to navigate its way through both Houses of 
Parliament. There is division over composition as well as no universal agreement 
on the constitutional impact an elected House of Lords would have on the 
principle of primacy and the constitutional relationship with the Commons (see 
sub-theme 4). Outputs A & B neatly illustrate that Lords reform is a highly 
complex and multi-faceted affair, as it affects other aspects of the constitution. In 
short, fundamental reform of the House of Lords may unfortunately appear to be 
at a superficial level, a deceptively simple process, which rather fittingly, was the 
essence of the title of the author’s very first article on this issue.98  
  
 
2. A narrative arc and synthesis of interim reform of the House of Lords 
up until 2015   
Whereas the first sub-theme concluded on the failure to achieve long-term 
reform, sub-theme 2 focuses instead on two aspects of more modest, small-scale 
changes to the House (one instigated by Government and one by an MP).  
Indeed, in his written evidence in 2013 to the Political and Constitutional Reform 
Select Committee (hereafter the PCRC), the author had argued that it was crucial 
that incremental reforms were undertaken as doing nothing was not viable. He 
predicted (correctly) that new peers would be inevitably appointed in due course, 
thereby further expanding the House.99 
The first historic aspect of interim reform examined the largely unsuccessful 
attempt by the Labour Government to implement a number of small-scale 
changes through the vehicle of its 2009-2010 Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Bill. This was analysed in various aspects of an article100 (Output C) 
which had been published in the journal of Liverpool Law Review (and is 
understood to be the only academic journal article written exclusively on the 
antecedents, process and all aspects of the content of this Act). It drew upon a 
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paper which the author had delivered to the 2010 SLS conference at 
Southampton University.101  This attempt at reform was notwithstanding the 
Labour Government’s earlier stated intention to leave reform as a manifesto 
commitment (see sub-theme 1). The antecedents of the Constitutional Reform 
and Governance Bill were located in its earlier incarnation as the 2008 Draft 
Constitutional Renewal Bill, which had been subject to pre-legislative scrutiny by 
a Joint Committee.102 The author submitted written evidence to this Committee 
and was quoted ten times throughout its report issued in July 2009.103 
The elements of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill concerning Lords 
reform included the abolition of hereditary by-elections, resignation and 
enhanced disciplinary powers; however, these were subsequently excised from 
the fully-fledged Bill during the wash up prior to the 2010 General Election.104 In 
particular, in Output C the author examined the issue of the abolition of hereditary 
by-elections (which take place on the death of an hereditary peer) the aim of 
which was to ensure that the hereditary numbers would gradually wither on the 
vine. The author asserted that this was a highly controversial proposal among 
peers as there is debate as to whether their depletion - in advance of Stage 2 
wholesale reform - would represent a breach of the 1999 undertaking105 (a 
compromise agreed in order to facilitate the passage of the 1999 House of Lords 
Bill). The author had earlier suggested to the Ministry of Justice that the abolition 
of these by-elections could prove problematic in the context of the 2008 White 
Paper’s proposal to remove them during the transition to a fully reformed 
chamber.106  More recently, in 2013 the author repeated this concern in a written 
submission107 which was quoted by the PCRC in its report investigating the issue 
of interim reform in which it revisited the abolition of hereditary by-elections.108  
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One reform element of the Bill concerning Lords reform that did make it onto the 
statute book was that relating to tax arrangements. Section 41 of the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 requires that parliamentary 
members are to be deemed resident and domiciled in the UK for tax purposes. 
The content of this provision was not particularly controversial, and in fact was 
welcomed by the author.109 The difficulty lay in that it was inserted into the Bill at 
the end of the Committee Stage in the Commons.  In fact, later in April 2012 in 
written evidence to the PCRC, he pertinently argued that Parliament should 
restrict late amendments.110 Although this tax provision had not been subject to 
pre-legislative scrutiny, as the author noted, it had at least followed on from two 
Private Members’ Bills which had pursued similar objectives.111 The failure to 
provide pre-legislative scrutiny applied also to the other elements of Lords reform 
listed above, although as the Output pointed out, these issues were hardly 
unknown to parliamentarians having been considered in the context of previous 
comparable Private Members’ Bills.112   
In respect of the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, the author had drawn attention 
en passant to the position of the House of Lords in the context of the codification 
of the Ponsonby rule regarding the ratification of treaties. He argued that a 
credible argument could be had in the future that its current subordinate role 
would have to be revisited in the event that the House ever became wholly or 
largely elected.  In other words, the Ponsonby rule was being codified in the 
context of an unreformed second chamber, a point quoted by the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill in its report.113 Furthermore, 
the author contended that this neatly illustrated a broader constitutional point that 
reform of the British constitution cannot be undertaken in a legal and political 
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vacuum, without secondary effects reverberating elsewhere in our constitutional 
arrangements.114 This is a point that the author has made on a number of 
occasions and represents a crucial lesson for constitutional reform.115 
The second historic aspect of interim reform concerned the successful passage 
of Dan Byles Private Member’s Bill which became the House of Lords Reform Act 
2014. This measure, which had its antecedents in the five unsuccessful Private 
Member Bills of Lord Steel of Aikwood,116 achieved modest Lords reform 
concerning resignation and expulsion of members from the House. The 2014 Act 
was examined in an article (Output D) which was published in the journal of 
Public Law. The Output analysed the antecedents, content and passage of the 
Bill through Parliament and drew upon a written submission made by the author 
in 2013 to the PCRC on interim Lords reform.117 This evidence was quoted and 
footnoted multiple times in the body of its report.118  The originality of the author’s 
Output is highlighted by the only other contemporaneous article on the Act being 
a very brief publication in 2014.119    
Output D began by considering the Act in the context of overall reform of the 
House of Lords in the light of the abandonment of the Coalition Government’s 
2012 Bill (see sub-theme 1). The author pointed out that fundamental reform had 
been elusive due to there being no real consensus on composition (see sub-
theme 4), together with the contentious preoccupation with form over function.120 
The Output identified the debate as to whether Lords reform was more likely to 
be achieved via incremental (and less ambitious) cumulative measures, rather 
than by one major reform. The author acknowledged the very real difficulty that 
by addressing anomalous small-scale issues that the press for more fundamental 
reform further down the road could be dissipated. In his written evidence to the 
PCRC he noted that the fear for some is that implementing interim reform could 
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‘merely serve to cement an appointed House’.121   The Output then identified the 
inconsistent policy approach of past Governments (Labour and Coalition) 
towards interim Lords reform measures including the former’s volte face in 
relation to hereditary peer by-elections identified earlier in Output C.122     
Part of the rationale behind the Act was to help reduce the bloated size of the 
House and this concern was examined in Output D. In fact, this still remains the 
most pressing issue facing the chamber.123 The author argued in his 2017 written 
submission to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select 
Committee (hereafter the PACAC), that the constant ratcheting-up of numbers 
had made the House unnecessarily large.124  Output D identified the concerns 
regarding size expressed both within the Lords via two Motions (one calling for 
restraint in appointments125 and one on the case for reducing its size)126 and 
outside Parliament (i.e. the Constitution Unit).127 It then considered some of the 
ways that the chamber could be reduced. These included a mandatory retirement 
provision, something which the author supported with reservations, and footnoted 
by the PCRC,128 though ultimately rejected by it.  He nevertheless made the 
same point in January 2017 to the PACAC that its key value would be 
immediately to reduce the size of the House.129 A further possibility was a fixed 
time-limit for new appointments, an option supported by the author,130 although 
the PCRC preferred to support a non-statutory scheme.  Another option was a 
general moratorium on new peers, a suggestion which the author 
recommended131 and although the PCRC acknowledged and footnoted it, did not 
consider it popular.132 In fact, in September 2011 the author had earlier stated in 
his written evidence to the Joint Committee that no new appointments should be 
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made until the shape of the reformed House had been generally agreed.133  In 
2017 in a written submission to the PACAC, he repeated this as a solution to the 
bloated size of the contemporary chamber.134  
The Output then examined the three key elements of the Act. Section 1 enabled 
peers to retire from the chamber and although the author noted that this was an 
eminently sensible provision,135 in constitutional terms it was significant as it 
broke the historic link between life members and the peerage.136 He also 
identified the constitutional problem that resignation raised for some 
commentators which was the absence of a ‘cooling off’ period specified in the Act 
provided a possibility that departing members could then simply ‘spring’ into the 
Commons.137 The author had previously made reference to this potential problem 
in the context of the 2009-10 Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill.138 
Although no cooling-off period formed part of the original incarnation of the Byles 
Bill, it was amended by MPs to close off re-admission to the Lords and so 
prevent the constitutional undesirability of members shuttling between chambers. 
The Output questioned the practical impact of the Act in significantly reducing the 
size of the House as it was pointed out that those who did retire would 
necessarily include those already on Leave of Absence. As such, this would only 
really therefore reduce the House’s notional size on paper.139 In any case, the 
author submitted to the PCRC that there was no financial incentive encouraging 
retirement, something which while it acknowledged and footnoted, felt there was 
little support for from its witnesses.140    
Section 2 enabled members to be expelled for non-attendance and the author 
agreed that this was wholly sensible, a point made to, and footnoted by, the 
PCRC in its report.141 The drafting of this section was, nevertheless, open to 
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criticism as the author contended that the attendance provision should have been 
made not only more rigorous, but retrospective. As an aside, in his 2017 written 
evidence to the PACAC, he argued that to encourage participation in the 
chamber the attendance threshold should be higher.142 The third aspect of the 
Act enabled members to be expelled for conviction for a serious criminal offence.   
The author had supported this as it was axiomatic that lawbreakers should not be 
lawmakers143  and that this principle had particular poignancy when these 
lawmakers were unelected. In his written evidence, he argued that there should 
be parity between MPs and peers in respect of criminal offences. This was 
supported and footnoted144 by the PCRC, as it recognised that there was 
unanimous support for the principle that those convicted of criminal offences 
should be expelled.  
The lesson for Lords reform from Outputs A to D is that change is more likely to 
be achieved by incremental steps, rather than as a single all-embracing 
fundamental Reform Bill. Even then, smaller-scale reforms will only follow if they 
enjoy broad parliamentary support and do not appear to be controversial.  The 
originality of the author’s Outputs is demonstrated by the seeming absence of 
any contemporary academic legal journals which provided a full synthesis and 
historic arc in respect of interim Lords reform of the last few years.            
 
 
3. The legislative process of constitutional reform with reference to the 
House of Lords 
This sub-theme drew upon a written submission made by the author in 2011 to 
the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (hereafter the House of 
Lords Select Committee) which was examining the process of legislative 
constitutional change.145 In its report, it recognised the absence of any single 
procedure for constitutional Bills and recommended the introduction of a 
consistent process for them. This would involve a Minister in charge of a Bill 
issuing a written statement setting out whether seven procedural elements had 
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been complied with.146 This sub-theme referenced a written and oral submission 
made by the author in 2012 to the PCRC on improving the standards of 
legislation.147   
In particular, this sub-theme is based squarely upon a more recent (and very 
lengthy) paper entitled ‘The process of constitutional legislation - an analysis of 
six case studies’148 delivered to the 2016 SLS Conference held at St Catherine’s 
College, Oxford University (Output G). This undertook innovative and completely 
original research into the process of six selected constitutional measures of the 
last decade and compared them with the House of Lords Select Committee’s 
checklist in order to assess their degree of compliance. This research produced a 
number of original Tables where the information complied by the author was 
displayed in a comparative format. The Bills surveyed included four which were 
directly relevant to the reform of the House of Lords:  the 2009-10 Constitutional 
Reform and Governance Bill (sub-theme 2), the 2012 House of Lords Reform Bill 
(sub-theme 1), the 2013-14 House of Lords Reform Bill (sub-theme 2) and the 
2004-05 Constitutional Reform Bill (as noted at the outset of sub-theme 1, this 
involved a structural reform of the House with the removal of the serving law 
lords).  Although all these Bills (to a greater or lesser extent) were connected to 
the reform of the House of Lords, for the sake of completeness, the last two Bills 
surveyed were the 2015-16 Scotland Bill and the 2010-11 Fixed-term 
Parliaments Bill.   
The Output identified that the surveyed measures were all Public Bills introduced 
by the Government of the day. The exception was the Private Member’s Bill of 
MP Dan Byles which in turn, raised an interesting legislative procedural question 
as to whether a constitutional Bill should ever take the form of a non-Public 
Bill.149  The Output then explored the question of what qualified as being 
classified as a constitutional Bill. The author in his 2011 written submission to the 
House of Lords Select Committee had argued that it was important to distinguish 
between constitutional and non-constitutional/ordinary measures, because 
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constitutional changes should require a special procedure to reflect their 
fundamental nature.150 It then quoted him in his contention that the powers of the 
second chamber should be strengthened (including in the context of a reformed 
House) in respect of scrutinising constitutional legislation.151 Later the author 
accepted in his oral evidence to the PCRC that there was no sharp line 
delineating public and private laws and in response to Committee member MP 
Simon Hart’s question as to how the constitution could be defined, the author 
provided a broad common sense definition. He stated that constitutional 
legislation ‘relates to the structure of government, its powers and responsibilities 
and how it is controlled. It is also about how the individual relates to state 
institutions.’152 When pressed later on this by the Committee Chair (Graham Allen 
MP), the author answered that one could not be too prescriptive as ‘you know 
when something is constitutional’ (emphasis added).153  For its part, the PCRC 
accepted that constitutional law was qualitatively different from other types of law 
and that it could ‘be identified through experience and common sense’.154  The 
author maintained that all the Bills surveyed in the Output were clearly 
constitutional measures.       
A second, but connected, debate concerned whether constitutional Bills could be 
further sub-divided on a first and second-class basis. As an aside, in his oral 
evidence to the PCRC the author listed a number of recent first-class Bills. He 
was then asked by the Committee Chair to clarify and classify the definitional 
aspects of higher order laws, to which he replied that it was not absolute, but that 
in general terms ‘it is first-class if it fundamentally affects the state’, whereas a 
second-class Bill  altered ‘the system of governance’.155 All the Bills surveyed 
were classified by the author in Table 1 as first-class. In fact, even though the 
House of Lords Reform Bill appeared, superficially, to be a minor constitutional 
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Bill, as noted in sub-theme 2, the lack of a ‘cooling-off’ period had the potential to 
have fundamental unintended long-term consequences for the House.156  The 
Output highlighted the first-class nature of the Bills in the survey and then 
examined their complexity, coherence and controversy with the results set out in 
comparative context in Table 1.  
The Output noted that, by default, over the years the reports of the House of 
Lords Select Committee had highlighted key constitutional standards, which had 
then been extracted by the Constitution Unit and brought together in a single 
Code.157 In terms of general legislative standards, the author pointed out that in 
2013 the PCRC had recommended the creation of a Joint Legislative Standards 
Committee158 (something which the author had supported in written evidence),159 
albeit this was rejected by the Coalition Government.  In its 2011 report, the 
House of Lords Select Committee had recommended that in the context of its 
recommended checklist, a Minister would be required to issue a parliamentary 
statement setting out whether their Bill provided for significant constitutional 
change.  Although the Coalition Government did not implement this checklist, the 
author considered it a valuable academic research exercise to correlate selected 
Bills (most of which related to Lords reform) with this checklist and assess their 
compliance as if the checklist had been in place. The key results of this original 
research were detailed in comparative terms in Table 2.   
The first requirement concerned the constitutional impact of the proposed Bill and 
the author deemed it laudable to focus Government attention on the 
consequences of its proposed legislation. It is pertinent that in the author’s written 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee, he had argued that there 
needed to be an appreciation as to how proposed legislative reforms would fit 
within the existing constitutional arrangements.160  It is a constitutional maxim 
that the British constitution cannot be altered in a legal and political vacuum, and 
the Output provided illustrative examples including that of the 2012 House of 
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Lords Reform Bill and the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill.161 Further, the 
Government of the day does not own the constitution, nor is it the property of any 
particular political party. A point made by the author in oral evidence to the PCRC 
in which he vigorously asserted that the British constitution belonged to the 
people162 (a demonstration of political, rather than legal sovereignty).  
The Output then examined the second element which was the extent of 
engagement with the public in the initial policy-making stage. The third element 
related to Cabinet scrutiny, which the author questioned as an unrealistic 
recommendation, given that it was seeking transparency of the executive 
decision-making process.163 The fourth element concerned the question as to 
whether a Green Paper had been published together with the degree of public 
engagement. The author specifically critiqued the concept of public consultation 
in relation to the Constitutional Reform Bill having been confined simply to detail 
and mechanics, rather than the overall policy of a new Supreme Court which had 
already been determined by the Labour Government.164 The importance of 
consultation, public engagement and public ownership were reaffirmed by the 
author in written evidence to the PCRC in the context of any future proposal for a 
new constitution.165   
The fifth element concerned the publication of a White Paper and pre-legislative 
scrutiny.  The House of Lords Select Committee noted that witnesses (including 
the author, who was footnoted) had argued that constitutional measures should 
include a White Paper and a draft Bill subject to pre-legislative scrutiny.166 In this 
way, the author, together with others who had submitted evidence, had helped to 
inform and shape this checklist.  The author’s research detailed in Output G 
supplemented Professor Hazell’s earlier study of Constitutional Bills, which had 
identified that only 3 out of 55 had being issued in draft and subject to pre-
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legislative scrutiny.167 The Output demonstrated that there had been 
improvements in this respect since Hazell’s study. This revealed that two Bills 
(the 2009-10 Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill and the 2012 House of 
Lords Reform Bill) out of the survey of six Bills had been issued in draft and 
subject to pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses of 
Parliament. The author pointedly highlighted the contrast in time allocated to 
these two Joint Committees.168 The Output also stated that as the 2004-05 
Constitutional Reform Bill had not been issued in draft, to some extent the House 
of Lords tried to rectify this by, very unusually, referring the Bill to an evidence-
taking select committee (to which the author submitted written evidence).169  
More recently, in written evidence in relation to the Fixed term-Parliaments Bill, 
the author asserted that Bills published in draft should be standard legislative 
practice170 and he welcomed that afforded the 2015 Scotland Bill.171  In oral 
evidence172 to the PCRC the author proposed a Joint Constitutional Committee to 
examine constitutional Bills in draft. Although it did not recommend this, the 
PCRC did state that once its Code (if adopted) had bedded down, then the issue 
of whether there should be such a constitutional legislative scrutiny committee 
could be re-considered.173       
The penultimate element concerned the Government’s justification for a 
referendum (see sub-theme 5). The author critically pinpointed that the emphasis 
in this aspect of the checklist was that of the Government having to justify holding 
a referendum. The issue of a national referendum did not apply to any of the Bills 
surveyed, although as noted in sub-theme 1, a number of MPs did call for a 
                                                          
167
 Hazell, ‘Time for a new convention: parliamentary scrutiny of constitutional bills 1997-2005’ (n 
30) 280. 
168
 See also Ryan, ‘The latest attempt at reform of the House of Lords’ (n 50) 2 and Draft House 
of Lords Reform Bill (report) (n 68) 172. In addition, the author (Ev w5) was critical of the 
Government’s consultation period in respect of its Cabinet Manual and his written evidence was 
footnoted in the following report: Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, 
Constitutional implications of the Cabinet Manual (HC 2010-11, 734) 26.      
169
 Constitutional Reform Bill (n 48) 401.  
170
 Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, Fixed-term Parliaments: the final year of 
a Parliament (HC 2013-14, 976) FTF0002. Also see, Draft House of Lords Reform Bill (report) (n 
68) 172. 
171
 Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, Constitutional implications of the 
Government’s draft Scotland clauses (HC 2014-15, 1022) DSB0002.  In 2011 the author 
suggested that the Government’s Draft Cabinet Manual should place more emphasis on the 
importance of pre-legislative scrutiny, particularly for constitutional Bills (n 168) Ev w5. 
172
 Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation (n 152) Q 170. 
173
 Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation (n 152) 46. 
47 
 
referendum on the 2012 House of Lords Reform Bill. As an aside, in September 
2011 in relation to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill,  the author lodged a call for a 
referendum on whether the parliamentary term in the legislation should be four or 
five years. The final requirement of the checklist was the most neglected area of 
the legislative process, that of post-legislative scrutiny. The author identified that 
the only Bill which this involved was the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. For the sake 
of completeness, the Output also examined other elements recommended by the 
House of Lords Select Committee (and produced original comparative 
information in Table 3). These detailed the time between First and Second 
Readings, timely Government responses to select committee reports and the 
wash-up process.     
The House of Lords Select Committee had also asserted that constitutional Bills 
should receive an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny and to this end the 
author’s Table 4 set out the findings of his original research comparing 
procedural aspects of the Bills surveyed (it supplemented Hazell’s work a decade 
earlier). In particular, the author made reference to Programme Motions and in 
his oral submission174 to the PCRC had questioned whether such a Motion 
should ever accompany a constitutional Bill on the basis that debate on such 
issues should not be restricted. Original research conducted by the author on the 
time spent at Second Reading in the Commons was comparable with findings 
from earlier parliamentary committee research which had indicated that a six 
hour debate was the norm175 (although the debate on the 2012 House of Lords 
Reform Bill was double this).176 Similarly, the author discovered that the time 
spent in a Committee of the Whole House was also comparable with Hazell’s 
earlier findings. Finally, original research suggested that the limited time spent at 
Third Reading indicated that it was of little value, rendering this stage merely 
perfunctory. Most recently, in the context of the impending Brexit legislation, the 
author in written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee asserted that 
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primary legislation in general needed much more effective scrutiny by 
Parliament.177  
As there is no single legislative procedure for constitutional changes, the lesson 
for Lords reform (and the constitution in general) is that there needs to be a more 
consistent approach. The author regretted the failure to adopt the checklist and 
its legislative standards which would undoubtedly improve constitutional 
legislation. There is a serious argument to be had that Bills of a constitutional 
nature should be afforded much more rigorous scrutiny as well as involve more 
public engagement. Moreover, reform of the Lords - as a constitutional change - 
should ideally only be implemented through the vehicle of a Public Bill. The 
innovation and originality of this Output is demonstrated by the fact that no 
publication has subjected the six Bills selected to the comparative procedural 
analysis undertaken by the author in Output G.          
 
 
4. No consensus on fundamental reform of the House of Lords  
As constitutional reform affects the national framework of the State, arguably, it 
should require the widest possible political consensus. In fact, the author in his 
2011 written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee stated that 
although it was unrealistic to expect complete unity on constitutional reform, as 
much agreement as possible was nevertheless needed.178 As noted in sub-
theme 1, in 2007 the House of Commons voted for the options of a wholly and an 
80 per cent elected chamber, whilst in contrast, the House of Lords approved a 
fully appointed House. In July 2007 the then Lord Chancellor stated that as a 
result, there was the potential to reach cross-party consensus on Lords reform.179 
The author, however, critiqued and questioned the assumption that these votes 
represented any real meaningful parliamentary or political consensus. He did so 
by providing an original and inventive interpretation of the parliamentary patterns 
of votes of both MPs and peers on the options for the composition of a fully 
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reformed House of Lords. This article (Output E) was published in 2009 in the 
journal Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly.  It had been partly informed by the 
constitutional expert Professor Dawn Oliver and based closely on a paper 
delivered to the 2008 SLS conference180 at the London School of Economics. For 
comparative purposes, this Output also had echoes from the author’s earlier 
research in his article published in The Law Teacher in respect of the earlier 
parliamentary votes on Lords reform in 2003.181 In addition, in 2004, he had 
predicted that agreement in the near future was highly unlikely following the 
results of the votes in 2003.182  
Output E made it clear at the outset that it was not considering the issue of the 
functions the House should perform, but instead was confined strictly to 
composition, as the votes had been.183 Notwithstanding the premise of the 
publication, it did initially identify two areas on which there was general 
parliamentary agreement. First, there was clear support (albeit not unanimous) 
within both Houses for bicameralism. Research undertaken by the author of the 
2007 parliamentary voting lists revealed that although 163 MPs had supported 
abolition, they virtually had all then proceeded to vote on the various options 
within the context of a bicameral system. It is arguable, therefore that this 
skewered the overall votes to some extent, therefore, given that their primary 
objective was for a single-chamber Parliament.   
The second issue on which there was broad support was the Motion to remove 
the rump of remaining hereditary peers; however, there was disagreement on the 
exact timing as to when they should exit. The author identified that a majority of 
Conservative MPs had voted against their removal without preconditions, as they 
had earlier supported an (albeit defeated) amendment to the above Motion which 
proposed to only remove the hereditaries once elected members sat in the 
reformed House. The author pointed out that the expulsion of the hereditary 
peers would, of necessity, have a disproportionate impact on the strength of the 
Conservative Party in the House, given that they are the largest hereditary 
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grouping.184 In terms of the view within the House of Lords, Output E identified 
that there was a general recognition (albeit with some minority resistance) that 
these remaining hereditary places should cease.  The Output then charted the 
Labour Government’s 2008-09 change in policy towards the abolition of 
hereditary by-elections (see sub-theme 3). It is clear that the hereditary peers will 
not form part of any long-term solution.     
The fully elected option was approved in the House of Commons by 113 votes. 
This was politically significant as MPs had, unlike in 2003, finally approved the 
principle of an elected second chamber and with a seemingly significant majority. 
However, on closer examination, unpicking of the figures by the author revealed 
that this majority was perhaps not as commanding as it might superficially 
suggest. The author critiqued it for a number of reasons.  For one thing, both 
Labour and Conservative MPs were clearly internally divided on this option and in 
fact, the majority of both parties had voted against this option in 2003. There was 
also no inter-House consensus as it was comprehensively rejected by the House 
of Lords in 2007 (as well as four years earlier), and no recent governmental or 
parliamentary report had recommended this option.  
A final critique was a suggestion that the legitimacy of the votes had been 
compromised by the suspicion of tactical voting. Indeed, a sizeable number of 
MPs (72) had voted for the diametrically opposite options of a wholly appointed 
and a wholly elected House. Most of these were Labour MPs and original 
research undertaken by the author revealed that 42 of these had also supported 
abolition. In short, they had rather curiously voted for all three extreme options 
(abolition, fully appointed and fully elected). The author raised with the Ministry of 
Justice whether consideration had been given to the issue of tactical voting, but 
this was dismissed on the basis that MPs had to be bound by the vote that they 
had cast.185  Quite apart from these odd voting patterns, an original calculation by 
the author indicated that if the votes of the abolitionist MPs who had voted in 
respect of the fully elected option were removed from the equation, the majority 
of 113 would fall to only 46. The author suggested that a resolution to this 
concern of tactical voting was to have another, but separate, free-standing vote.   
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The second option of an 80 per cent elected House was voted for by the slimmer 
majority of 38. This was critiqued by the author for three reasons:  First, it was 
less than half of the total membership of the House of Commons and the majority 
of both Labour and Conservative MPs had rejected it (even though it appeared 
consistent with the latter’s 2005 manifesto commitment) as they had both done in 
2003. It was also rejected by the House of Lords in 2007 and previously in 
2003186 by very similar majorities.  In contrast to the block of MPs who had voted 
for the fully appointed and fully elected options, original research undertaken by 
the author identified that only five MPs voted for both the wholly appointed and 
80 per cent elected models.  
The Output finished by critiquing the arguments for and against an elected 
chamber and this was done through the prism of the MPs and peers during their 
debates (it also had echoes of the author’s earlier article in relation to the 2003 
votes).187 It noted the fully elected option had the largest majority and an original 
calculation by the author involving a conflation of the Commons votes in 2003 
with that in 2007 demonstrated that the 80 per cent vote compared unfairly with 
the wholly elected option.  In particular, the author highlighted that a wholly 
elected House avoided the potential problems associated with hybridity such as a 
clash of two classes of member, the debate over the acceptable proportional 
balance, and the fear of it being an inherently unstable settlement in the absence 
of an entrenched codified constitution.188  In contradistinction, the arguments in 
favour of a hybrid option were that it was consistent with two of the 2005 
manifestoes as well as parliamentary and governmental reports in the last 
decade. Original research undertaken by the author indicated that if the 2007 
votes of the abolitionist MPs are removed from the equation, it revealed that the 
majority for an 80 per cent elected House increased to 110. In addition, this 
option was narrowly defeated in 2003.189   
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Output E concluded by returning to the question of consensus and made it clear 
that universal agreement was simply impossible. It raised the question as to a 
consensus between whom and on what?  The parliamentary votes clearly 
indicated that there was no inter-House agreement as the Lords had voted 
overwhelmingly (and consistently) for an appointed House and had rejected 
decisively all other options. The author stressed that, nonetheless, the 2008 
White Paper had dismissively ignored the wishes of peers. This led, in turn, to 
consideration of a possible conflict between the two Houses in the event of any 
long-term Reform Bill being presented to peers.  The Output also noted the 
peculiarity of the British constitution that such reform did not legally require the 
consent of either the second House or the people in national referendum (on the 
latter see sub-theme 5). Nor was there any inter-political party consensus, as 
other than the Liberal Democrats, the two main political parties were split on 
Lords reform.   
What is also clear is that there is no widespread agreement on the electoral 
system. The author reiterated this point to the Ministry of Justice in 2008 that it 
would be very difficult to obtain agreement on this issue.190 One issue critiqued in 
relation to both the 2003 and 2007 votes was that the term ‘election’ had not 
been particularised. This was critical because some electoral systems are seen 
as more acceptable than others. In addition, it raised other connected (but 
contested), electoral issues such as cycles, constituency sizes, etc. The author 
also reaffirmed that the electoral system for the Lords could not be determined in 
hermetically sealed isolation from other constitutional changes (future or 
otherwise) to the House of Commons – a point reaffirmed to the Ministry of 
Justice in 2008.191 Finally, there is debate over powers. As pointed out by the 
author, it appears logical and indeed constitutional that a more democratic House 
should enjoy a corresponding increase in its powers192 (see sub-theme 5).      
The Output stated that although most may agree reform is necessary, there is no 
uniform agreement as to how it should be secured. This helps to explain why, 
from an historical perspective, long-term reform has not been realised (see sub-
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theme 1).  Indeed, the Output predicted (accurately) that for the 2011 centenary 
celebrations, the composition of the House would be in the same partly reformed 
state as it had been at the time of the journal publication in 2009. Moreover,  in 
his 2004 article the author had rather presciently asserted that as Parliament had 
failed to give a clear signal in its 2003 votes, the one option which had not been 
voted on - that of the status quo - may well by default, be the one which prevails 
for the foreseeable future.193  Thirteen years later we are still in that status quo.  
The lessons for Lords reform are that, notwithstanding the votes of 2007, there is 
no inter-House or inter-party consensus within Parliament on how to complete 
the reform of the House of Lords. It is equally clear that any future proposal for 
wholesale reform will be bicameral and exclude any hereditary element.  The key 
lesson is that constitutional reform cannot be moulded in a vacuum immune from 
other secondary effects reverberating elsewhere throughout the constitution. The 
originality of the Output is underscored by the fact that it is understood that no 
other academic legal journal article has examined, interpreted and analysed the 
underlying patterns of the 2007 parliamentary votes.    
 
 
5. A referendum on fundamental reform of the House of Lords  
The conclusion of sub-theme 4 was that there was no political or parliamentary 
consensus on the issue of how to complete the reform of the House of Lords. 
This political impasse leads into the final sub-theme in which the author called for 
a nation-wide referendum to be held on Lords reform. In essence, he argued that 
the Coalition Government ought to have acceded to the recommendation of the 
2012 Joint Committee that the House of Lords Reform Bill should have been 
subject to a nation-wide referendum. This sub-theme had its antecedents in a 
2014 SLS conference paper delivered at Nottingham University194 and, 
thereafter, a revised version (Output F) was published in Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly195 (a piece described in editorial review as strong). These in turn, had 
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previously drawn upon a written submission in September 2011 to the Joint 
Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill, which had adopted the 
author’s proposal for a referendum.196  His suggestion was also supported in the 
Alternative Report written and published separately by a number of members of 
the Joint Committee197 (see sub-theme 1). The author’s view that a referendum 
should take place also formed part of his oral evidence in July 2012 to the 
PCRC.198 In fact, this was given the week before the Second Reading of the 
House of Lords Reform Bill, during which around 20 MPs had supported holding 
a referendum (see sub-theme 1). Some of these MPs did so by expressly 
mentioning the Joint Committee’s recommendation199 (which, of course, had 
adopted the author’s view).  
As an aside, in September 2011 the author placed on the HM Government’s 
website a call for a national referendum to take place on the Coalition 
Government’s 2011 Draft House of Lords Reform Bill (i.e. whether the House 
should be largely or wholly elected). This followed the author’s written evidence 
to the House of Lords Select Committee in 2011 that referendums should be held 
on major constitutional issues (including the House of Lords).200 Output F 
concluded that the failure to hold a referendum was not only a lost opportunity in 
2012, but that in the event that proposals for long-term reform of the House of 
Lords appear again on the political agenda, the arguments advanced made a 
compelling case for a national referendum to be held. At the time of writing, the 
prospects of such were highly unlikely given the incumbent Conservative 
Government’s May 2017 manifesto commitment on long-term Lords reform not 
being a priority.   
The Output provided a brief history of recent attempts at Lords reform in order to 
place the proposal of a referendum in its context and was informed by, and drew 
upon, various articles written by the author (see sub-theme 1).  It then explored 
the position of the referendum in the context of the British constitution, which 
historically has been seen as alien to the constitutional and political traditions of 
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the United Kingdom, as well as having been executive driven.201  Direct 
democracy has been viewed as undermining parliamentary sovereignty and 
representative democracy, as it allows for the displacement of the Burkean 
concept of a judgement made by elected parliamentarians. Notwithstanding, the 
concept of a referendum on constitutional issues has some weighty provenance 
as it was proposed by the legal theorist Professor Dicey over a century ago.202 
He approved of selective referendums in order to give effect to the will of the 
people as a negative (and so conservative) device.  In fact, such is the increasing 
prominence of domestic referendums that in 2009 the House of Lords Select 
Committee was moved to investigate the role of referendums in the United 
Kingdom. Its conclusion was that if they were to be held, they should be ‘used in 
relation to fundamental constitutional issues’, but that Lords reform (other than its 
abolition) was not one.203 This proposition was one which the author vigorously 
contested and posited four key arguments for a referendum on the reform of the 
House of Lords.  
The first argument was that it was necessary owing to the envisaged change in 
composition to a largely elected House, which would represent a seminal 
constitutional reform of the United Kingdom’s uncodified constitutional 
arrangements. Output F then critiqued the House of Lords Select Committee’s 
failure to designate and include the reform of the House of Lords as a 
fundamental constitutional issue warranting a referendum. The author argued in 
the Output, as well as earlier in his written evidence to the Joint Committee,204 
that the constitution could not be changed in a vacuum, as reform of the second 
chamber would necessarily have secondary effects reverberating elsewhere. He 
argued that an elected House would have a profound effect on two key 
constitutional relationships, viz, inter-House relations and executive/Parliament 
relations. In other words, an increase in the democratic legitimacy of the second 
chamber by virtue of election would go hand in glove with an increasing 
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assertiveness and corresponding potential threat to the primacy of the Commons 
(see sub-theme 1). He asserted in written evidence to the Joint Committee that 
these elected members inevitably would feel emboldened by their new-found 
democratic legitimacy. This, in turn, would require a rewiring of the existing 
conventions which regulate the House to take account of the new constitutional 
landscape within Parliament.205    
The Output observed that the conclusion of the House of Lords Select Committee 
was implicitly (albeit not expressly) rejected by the Joint Committee. The latter 
stated that by any standard the shift to an elected House would be ‘of major 
constitutional significance’206 and in light of such constitutional change, 
recommended that ‘the Government should submit the decision to a 
referendum’.207 Moreover, the Alternative Report asserted that, in practice, such 
constitutional changes to the second chamber could not be done without a 
referendum.208  
A second argument was that a constitutional and political precedent had already 
been laid down with the national referendum in May 2011 on the electoral system 
for MPs.209 The author posed the question that if it could be argued that a 
possible change in the electoral system from one majoritarian system to another 
warranted a referendum; then why not one on introducing the principle of election 
into the upper House? In short, it was constitutionally inconsistent not to hold 
one, a point also asserted in his written evidence to the Joint Committee.210 The 
Output also argued that once the principle of holding a national referendum to 
settle a constitutional issue had been conceded, politically it was difficult to 
prevent it being invoked in relation to other (and arguably more significant) 
constitutional issues. On a broader point, in his oral evidence to the PCRC the 
author argued that there should be referendums on significant constitutional 
issues.211 In fact, as noted the Alternative Report contended that it would be 
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unwise to proceed with major national constitutional change without first seeking 
a direct mandate from the people.  
The Coalition Government countered that as reform of the House of Lords had 
been set out as policy in all three 2010 manifestoes of the main political parties, a 
referendum was not necessary. The author identified that a similar argument had 
also been used by the previous Labour Government (i.e. that Lords reform had 
been pre-figured in the 2005 manifestoes). It is rather fitting that according to the 
PCRC in its recent report of July 2014 on a written constitution for Britain, there 
were now constitutional conventions developing as to when referendums should 
take place. In particular, it posited a referendum should be held when novel 
constitutional arrangements were being proposed.212 This fitted in seemlessly 
with the author’s referendum proposition, as an elected House would neatly fall 
into this developing category.       
A third argument for a referendum was based on the fact that it avoided an 
introspective parliamentary approach to this fundamental constitutional issue. 
Although the British constitution can be altered without any reference to the 
people, it is also a maxim that the constitution is not the preserve of any one 
political party, let alone a transient Government of the day,213 and that an insular 
attitude has been the historic hallmark of debate on Lords reform (see sub-theme 
1).  In fact, the Joint Committee quoted the author in the following terms:  ‘Mark 
Ryan, Senior Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law at Coventry 
University, maintained that a referendum was necessary as “constitutional reform 
has been far too parliamentary-centric and introspective without any real 
reference to engaging the wider public.”’214 The Alternative Report also stated 
that: ‘On public engagement we agree with the evidence of Mark Ryan, Senior 
Lecturer at Coventry University.’215 The author also made this point in his oral 
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evidence to the PCRC when he asserted that Parliament ‘needs to engage more 
with the people.’216 In other words, the votes on Lords reform in both 2003 and 
2007 had essentially been exclusively parliamentary affairs. In contrast, a 
national referendum on Lords reform would serve the political principle of 
participatory government and also confer constitutional and democratic 
legitimacy on any reform endorsed. The author argued strenuously that the 
significant changes which would necessarily ensue warranted express public 
approval from the ‘constituent power’. In his oral evidence to the PCRC he added 
that he was in favour of referendums because ‘After all, the people are the 
constituent power.’217 
Output F then placed the issue of the legitimacy of the people as the constituent 
power in its proper theoretical constitutional context with particular reference to 
the writings of Professors Tierney,218 Loughlin219 and Lindahl.220 The Publication 
also critiqued the idea that the public lacked the information to be able to make 
an informed decision and that a referendum was unnecessary because the public 
view was already known. Indeed, the author pointed out in his oral evidence to 
the PCRC that recent polls indicated that people were generally in favour of 
referendums.221 The Output  pointed out that it would have had an educative 
effect222 and critiqued the assumption that the public lacked the capacity to 
participate.  
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Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, Voter engagement in the UK (HC 2014-15, 
232) 73-4.   
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A fourth argument was that it would provide some much needed clarity on an 
issue which has dogged parliamentarians for over a century. As demonstrated in 
sub-theme 4, there is no inter-House agreement or consensus between (or even 
within) the main two political parties in respect of the 2007 parliamentary votes. 
The Output critiqued the idea that the 2010 manifestos meant that no referendum 
was necessary, as for one thing, the issue of Lords reform was subsumed within 
a sea of other political issues. Secondly, drawing upon the mandate theory was 
problematic as the manifesto commitments of the two parties in the Coalition 
Government were contradictory,223 as the Conservatives had supported a hybrid 
chamber, whereas the Liberal Democrats had pledged a wholly elected House. 
These were not matters of degree, but of kind – a point made in the author’s 
written evidence to the Joint Committee,224 but fudged in the 2010 Coalition 
Agreement. Finally, on a purely practical level, the author posed the question of 
how a voter who supported an appointed House could have registered this 
preference at the 2010 General Election?225 The author stated that the 
importance of Lords reform warranted a stand-alone referendum in order that this 
issue could be isolated. He stressed that as the United Kingdom has had 
experience of national referendums, there was a compelling case for one to take 
place in 2012, as well as in the future should concrete proposals be presented 
again.         
The final aspect of Output F provided an original, unique and inventive practical 
solution as to when the referendum should have taken place, together with the 
nature of the questions to be asked. In brief, the author devised and proposed an 
original and bespoke two-part question in the form of a pre-legislative 
‘preferendum’. This was in order to avoid an ambiguous result and ameliorate 
any political resistance in the House of Lords in respect of a Lords Reform Bill. 
The author recognised that in mid-2012 this was a politically unlikely solution for 
the Coalition Government to adopt and so proposed an alternative, post-
legislative referendum which would have involved a sunrise clause being inserted 
into the Bill in order to activate the legislation.  
                                                          
223
 Draft House of Lords Reform Bill (report) (n 68) 174.   
224
 Draft House of Lords Reform Bill (report) (n 68) 173. 
225
 A very similar point was raised with the Ministry of Justice, see Ryan, Submission to the 
Ministry of Justice (n 60).  
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The lesson for Lords reform is that there is clearly an arguable case for directly 
engaging with the people as the constituent power in order to provide a solution 
to this perennial constitutional issue. The author is unaware of any modern 
academic journal article which has specifically proposed a referendum on the 
reform of the House of Lords and this article provided an original and practical 






























CONCLUSION    
In his Portfolio of Evidence the author has provided a thematic, rigorous and 
integrated analysis of attempts at reform of the House of Lords and the lessons 
to be learned. His Outputs A to D provided a full synthesis of the events in the 
ebb and flow of both long-term and interim Lords reform in recent years and have 
added progressively to this ongoing debate. In particular, the key lesson for Lords 
reform is that fundamental reform is highly unlikely in the near future given the 
lack of political drive and a general unwillingness to compromise on such a 
divisive issue. The only reform likely is incremental, through more modest and 
non-controversial steps. Output G applied a methodology (in the form of the 
House of Lords Select Committee’s checklist) which was then applied to select 
constitutional Bills, most of which had a connection to the House of Lords. The 
author regrets the failure of Government to adopt this checklist and the lesson for 
legislative constitutional reform is that a more consistent approach is required for 
constitutional changes. In Output E the author challenged the notion of there 
being any real consensus for completing the reform of the House of Lords which 
the 2007 votes might otherwise have suggested. The lack of consensus 
extended to the impact introducing the principle of election would have on the 
Commons and the Government, thus illustrating that Lords reform is not only 
complicated and multifaceted, but cannot be undertaken in a vacuum, isolated 
from its effects on other aspects of the constitution    Finally, Output F developed 
an original solution to help try to break the deadlock on this issue and provided a 
rigorous case for engaging directly with the people in the form of a referendum.    
Although long-term reform of the House of Lords remains unrealised, events will 
continually unfold. By way of example, the Burns Speaker Committee is 
scheduled to report in late 2017, which may well lead to concrete proposals to 
reduce the size of the burgeoning House.  It also remains to be seen how the 
Salisbury Convention will operate in the context of a minority Conservative 
Government with all the constitutional, legal and political implications that this 
raises. Indeed, this neatly illustrates that Lords reform bridges the gap between 
law and the political sciences. In the future, the author will continue to 
assiduously research the area of constitutional reform (and the reform of the 
House of Lords in particular) and actively engage with, and outreach to, 
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Parliament and its select committees on these matters.  
In conclusion, the author has researched and taught Lords reform for two 
decades and acquired considerable expertise in this area. His Outputs and 
writings represent an original, integrated and coherent body of work which, 
collectively, have added significantly to the debate and narrative on this topical 
and long-standing issue. In fact, partly due to the dynamism of events, there is a 
dearth of legal articles tracking the events of Lords reform and the author has 
endeavoured to fill this deficiency. He has contributed to the academic 
community through publications in well-respected legal journals and delivered 
multiple conference papers at the Society of Legal Scholars (as well as being 
referenced in legal textbooks). In addition, he has gained recognition in a wider 
political and parliamentary context through written submissions to various 
parliamentary select committees and been invited to provide oral evidence as a 
legal expert witness. Not only have these committees quoted and footnoted the 
author on numerous occasions, but in doing so, he has helped to shape and 
inform their reports/recommendations. In short he has earned a credible 
reputation as a constitutional academic with a specialism in the area of the 
reform of the House of Lords. The author, accordingly, wishes to be considered 
for a PhD by Portfolio in the form of this Critical Overview Document and Portfolio 
of Evidence. 
    
On-going work and aspirations beyond PhD: 
(a) In the short term (i.e. the second half of 2017) the author will continue to 
work on providing the completed, and fully revised, manuscript of the 
fourth edition of his textbook (this edition had been specifically requested 
by the publisher - Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group - owing to the  
popularity of the book). This will be a very comprehensive revision given 
the monumental changes since the last edition and will include references 
to the reform of the House of Lords. 
(b) At the same time and during 2018 the author will continue with his 
research into the dynamic area of constitutional reform (and the House of 
Lords in particular) with the overall objective of progressing to a Reader in 
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Law. He will specifically work on an article on a written constitution for the 
United Kingdom (including the position of a second chamber). In addition, 
he will work on a broader and more ambitious research project into the 
process of constitutional legislation (on this the author has been in contact 
with Professor Feldman of Cambridge University who has kindly offered to 
review it in due course). In order to support this major project, the author 
will investigate and try to secure a research grant for it. 
(c) In the longer term it is the author’s intention to write a comparative (and 
completely original) analysis of the Irish and British Constitutions, thereby 
drawing upon both his undergraduate studies and two decades of teaching 





















APPENDIX A: PUBLICATIONS AND CV  
 
Authored book(s): 
Ryan M and Foster S, Unlocking Constitutional and Administrative Law (4th edn, 
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standards for constitutional legislation?’ 
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Written evidence to parliamentary committees/Government 
Ryan M (2004) Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee: 
Constitutional Reform Bill (HL 2003-04, 125-II, 401). 
Ryan M (2008) Submission to the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional 
Renewal Bill: Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (2007-08 HL 166-II, HC 551-II, Ev 
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the body of the main report (Volume I). 
Ryan M (2008) Submission to the Ministry of Justice on the 2008 Government 
White Paper on House of Lords reform. 
Ryan M (2010) Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee: Fixed-term 
Parliaments Bill (HL 2010-11, 69) - evidence FTP 32 published online at 
www.parliament.uk/hlconstitution and was quoted in the main body of the report.  
Ryan M (2011) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee: Constitutional implications of the Cabinet Manual (HC 
2010-11, 734) - evidence Ev w5 published online at www.parliament.uk/pcrc, and 
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Ryan M (2011) Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution: The process of constitutional change (HL 2010-12, 177) -  evidence 
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Reform Bill: Draft House of Lords Reform Bill (report) (2010-12, HL 284-III, HC 
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In addition, he was also quoted in the Alternative Report, House of Lords: An 
alternative way forward (April 2012) issued by a minority of members of the Joint 
Select Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill. 
 
Ryan M (2013) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee: Prospects for codifying the relationship between 
central and local government (HC 2012-13, 656-I) Ev w182.  In January 2013 the 
author was formally invited to the reception of the launch of this report. 
Ryan M (2013) Written submission to the House of Commons Political and 
Constitutional Reform Select Committee on Legislative Standards: Ensuring 
standards in the quality of legislation (HC 2012-13, volume II 85) Ev w53. 
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Ryan M (2013) Oral submission of evidence to the House of Commons Political 
and Constitutional Reform Select Committee on Legislative Standards:  Ensuring 
standards in the quality of legislation (HC 2012-13, volume I 85). He was quoted 
in the main body of the report.   
Ryan M (2013) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee: House of Lords Reform; what next? (HC 2013-14, 
251) Ev w9. This evidence was quoted in the main body of the report. 
Ryan M (2013) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee: Constitutional role of the judiciary if there were a 
codified constitution (HC 2013-14, 802) CRJ0001. 
Ryan M (2014) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee: Fixed-term Parliaments Act: the final year of a 
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body of the report. 
Ryan M (2014) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee on voter engagement: Voter engagement in the UK 
(HC 2014-15, 232) VUK 0031. This evidence was referenced number of times in 
the main body of the report. 
Ryan M (2015) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee on the Cabinet Manual - the author had been invited 
by the Select Committee to submit evidence in order to supplement his previous 
submission on the Cabinet Manual (Revisiting the Cabinet Manual (HC 2014-15, 
233) RCM 04. 
Ryan M (2015) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee on increasing voter engagement (a follow up report). 
The Select Committee had contacted the author to ask him to submit evidence: 
Voter engagement in the UK: follow up (HC 2014-15, 938) PVE0050. 
Ryan M (2015) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee on whether a written constitution should be introduced 
– the Chair of the  Select Committee had contacted the author to ask him to 
submit evidence: Consultation on A new Magna Carta? (HC 2014-15, 599) 
AMC0079.  In March 2015 (at the invitation of the Chair of the Select Committee) 
he attended Parliament for the launch of 2015 document ‘The UK constitution’.  
Ryan M (2015) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee in relation to pre-legislative scrutiny of the clauses of 
the 2015 Draft Scotland Bill: Constitutional implications of the Government’s draft 
Scotland clauses (HC 2014-15, 1022) DSB0002. He was referenced a number of 
times in the body of this report.  
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Ryan M (2015) Submission to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Select Committee in relation to the ‘Pocket Constitution’ - no report was 
issued as the Select Committee was not reappointed for the following Parliament.  
Ryan M (2016) Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution: The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers (HL, 2016-17, 123) 
LEG0034. This evidence was referenced in relation to delegated powers. 
Ryan M (2017) Submission to the House of Commons Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Select Committee on the lessons to be learned from the EU 
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Ryan M (2017) Submission to the House of Commons Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Select Committee on Brexit.  Although this evidence was 
composed by the author, due to the snap 2017 General Election, the Committee 















In November 2007 the Master of the Rolls referred to one of the author’s articles 
in a lecture delivered at Hertfordshire University. 
 
The author’s written evidence in April 2004 to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill argued (together with other 
submissions) that the choice of candidates for a Supreme Court Justice proposed 
in Clause 21 (ie between 2 to 5) would confer an ‘unacceptably wide’ margin of 
discretion on the executive. He suggested that consideration be given to 
confining the number of candidates. The Bill was subsequently amended by the 
Select Committee so as to allow the presentation of one candidate at a time - 
now section 29 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
 
In October 2009 he was referred to by the House of Commons Library Research 
Paper (Paper 09/73) on the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill (a paper 
supplied to MPs in order to inform debate on the above Bill). 
In 2008 the author was listed as a parliamentary expert (in respect of the United 
Kingdom) by the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and 
Documentation.  
In 2010 and 2012 he was nominated by his undergraduate students for the award 
of the (national) lecturer of the year. 
In 2011 he was on the Coventry University shortlist of three from the entire 
university staff having been nominated for Most Inspirational Lecturer at the 
University. 
In 2015 the Chair of the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee 
thanked the author for the contributions that he had made to the committee 
during its parliamentary lifetime.  
In the last five years the author has been approached and asked to write a 
Constitutional Law textbook by both Oxford University Press and Taylor & 
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Joint Committee (Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill 
2011-12) to be distinguished from the Joint Committee on the Constitutional 
Renewal Bill 2008. 
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PCRC Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee (2010-15). 
 
PACAC Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee (post 
2015). 
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